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The fallowing essay is based on a similar
discussion that appeared in World Refugee
Survey 1996 (© 1996 U.S. Committee for
Refugees). Publication is by permission.

106

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHCXJL

International refugee law rarely determines
how governments respond to involuntary
migration. States pay lip service to the
importance of honoring the right to seek
asylum, but in practice devote significant
resources to keep refugees away from their
borders. Although the advocacy community
invokes formal protection principles, it
knows that governments are unlikely to live
up to these supposedly minimum standards.
The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) shows similar
ambivalence about the value of refugee law.
It insists that refugees must always be able
to access dignified protection, even as it
gives tacit support to national and
intergovernmental initiatives that undermine
this principle. So long as there is
equivocation about the real authority of
international refugee law, many states will
feel free to treat refugees as they wish, and
even to engage in the outright denial of
responsibility toward them.
Ironic though it may seem, I believe that the
present breakdown in the authority of
international refugee law is attributable to
its failure explicitly to accommodate the
reasonable preoccupations of governments
in the countries to which refugees flee.
International refugee law is part of a system
of state self-regulation. It will therefore be
respected only to the extent that receiving
states believe that it fairly reconciles
humanitarian objectives to their national
interests. In contrast, refugee law arbitrarily
assigns full legal responsibility for
protection to whatever state asylum-seekers
are able to reach. It is a peremptory regime.
Apart from the right to exclude serious
criminals and persons who pose a security
risk, the duty to avoid the return of any and
all refugees who arrive at a state's frontier
takes no account of the potential impact of
refugee flows on the receiving state. This
apparent disregard for their interests has
provided states with a pretext to avoid
international legal obligations altogether.

The Demise of Interest-Convergence
Much of the debate during the drafting of
the Refugee Convention [of 1951) was devoted
to how best to protect the national self-interest
of receivi.ng states. The Convention grants states
wide-ranging authority to deny refugee status to
criminals and persons perceived to endanger
national security Perhaps most fundamentally,
there was agreement that international refugee
law would not impose a duty on states permanently to admit all refugees who arrive at their
borders. Instead, refugees are to be afforded
protection against refoulemenl. States are
required only to avoid returning refugees to an
ongoing risk of persecution. If and when the
risk of serious harm ends, so too does refugee
status. In this sense, refugee law is clearly based
upon a theory of temporary protection.
The absence of a duty to grant permanent
residence to refugees was critical to the successful negotiation of the Convention. While willing
to protect refugees against return to persecution, states demanded the right ultimately to
decide which, if any, refugees would be allowed
to resettle in their territories. While the refugee
flows of post-war Europe were felt to be logistically and politically impossible to stop, the formal distinction between refugee status and permanent residence reassured states that their sovereign authority over immigration would be
respected.
Despite this legal prerogative to admit
refugees only as temporary residents, many
developed states initially believed their domestic
interests would be served by granting permanent resident status to refugees. Because
refugees seeking protection in the years following the Second World War were of European
stock, their cultural assimilation was perceived
as relatively straightforward. Refugees also
helped to meet acute post-war labor shonages.
The reception of refugees opposed to
Communist regimes moreover reinforced the
ideological and strategic objectives of the capitalist world. This pervasive interest-convergence
between refugees and the governments of
industrialized states resulted in a pattern of generous admission policies.
The reasons that induced this openness to
the arrival of refugees have, however, largely
withered away Most refugees who seek entry to
developed states today are from the poorer
countries of the South: their "different" racial
and social profile is seen as a challenge to the
cultural cohesion of many developed states. The
economies of industrialized states no longer
require substantial and indiscriminate infusions
of labor. Nor is there ideological or strategic
value in the admission of most refugees. To the
contrary, governments more often vi.ew refugee
protection as an irritant to political and economic relations with the state of origin.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising
that governments have rejected the logic of con-

tinuing to grant refugees a "trump card" on the
usual rules of immigration control. States have
not, however, responded by reverting to the
Refugee Conventions duty to admit refugees
only temporarily. Such a policy shift was proposed by Norway, but the governments of most
other industrialized countries have instituted
temporary protection only on a situation-specific basis.
This resistance to treating temporary protection as the norm is partly explained by deeply
ingrained policy preferences in traditional countries of immigration, such as the United States,
Canada, and Australia. Any attempt to end the
now-routine linkage between refugee status and
permanent residence in these states would
require fundamental amendments to domestic
immigration legislation built up during the era
of openness to Cold War refugees. While
European governments have historically been
more receptive to the admission of temporary
residents, they are concerned with ensuring that
temporary protection of refugees can truly be
brought to an end. When large-scale guestworker programs closed down in the 1970s, there
were still nearly 12 million "temporary" residents living in Western Europe. The guestworkers' social and personal attachments to their
host states made deportation a politically unrealistic option, forcing governments ultimately to
allow them to remain. European policymakers
worry that a generalized temporary protection
system for refugees would similarly be no more
than "a slow way of saying yes" to permanent
admission.
The viability of temporary protection as a
way of reconciling the needs of refugees to the
national interests of receiving states has not,
however, been seriously explored to date. This
is because governments of the industrialized
world have new options to prevent refugee
flows from challenging their sovereign authority
over immigration. States now believe that
technologies of border control can prevent most
asylum-seekers from ever reaching their
territories. They also see promise in the kind of
in-country intervention undertaken in Iraq and
Bosnia, which prevented would-be refugees
from even leaving their own states. In sum,
governments today see little reason to accept
the compromises inherent in the Refugee
Convention. Since legal duties to refugees arise
only once refugees successfully access a states
jurisdiction, why not simply keep refugees at
arms-length? Why depend on international
law's temporary protection regime to safeguard
sovereign authority over immigration if it is
possible simply to prevent the arrival of
refugees in the first place? Governments
increasingly deal with refugees on a harsh and
unregulated basis because they see international
refugee laws mechanism to reconcile state
interests to refugee interests as an anachronism.

Politics of Nan-Entree

Relegation of Burdens to the South

Instead of embracing the Refugee
Conventions solution of temporary protection,
the response of developed states to the end of
the interest-convergence between refugees and
receiving states has been to avoid receiving
claims to refugee status altogether. Most
Northern states have implemented non-entree
mechanisms, including visa requirements on the
nationals of refugee-producing states, carrier
sanctions, burden-shifting arrangements, and
even the forcible interdiction of refugees at frontiers and in international waters. The simple
purpose of non-entrce strategies is to keep
refugees away from us.
Non-entree is an explicable, if reprehensible,
response to the breakdown 0f the social and
political conditions that previously led industrialized states to assimilate refugees. Seeing no
need to accept the risks assumed to follow from
a generalized temporary protection system,
states have taken the more brutal (yet less visible) step of keeping refugees as far away as possible from their territories.

This blunt assault by the North on refugee
migration has reinforced the confinement of
most of the worlds refugees to their regions of
origin in the South. Africa shelters more than
double the number of refugees protected in all
of Europe, North America, and Oceania combined. The Ivory Coast alone protects nearly
twice as many refugees as are presently in the
United States of America. In desperately poor
countries like Jordan, Djibouti, Guinea,
Lebanon, and Armenia, the ratio of refugee
population to total population is about 1: 10. Yet
refugee law establishes no burden-sharing
mechanism to offset the enormous contribulions made by these reception states of the
South.
Some degree of solidarity is achieved by
"good offices," UNHCR assistance, ad hoc
regimes such as the Comprehensive Plan of
Action for Indochinese Refugees, and the like.
But because these efforts are orchestrated outside international refugee law, in the realm of
discretion or voluntarism, there are few guarantees of meaningful support for the states of the
South. With assistance from the developed
world normally provided after the fact and on a
situation-specific basis, Southern governments
are increasingly turning away from traditions of
hospitality toward refugees. While they normally lack the resources and sophisticated border
control systems used by the North to enforce
non-cntrcc, the governments of less developed
countries have coerced refugees to return to
their countries of origin. Some also engage in
absolutely blunt denials of access, such as the
decision by Zaire simply to close its border to
Rwandan refugees.

The "Right to Remain"
Northern governments have recently extended their prophylactic program by championing
the refugees "right to remain" in his or her own
state. The "right to remain" is superficially
attractive. After all, the best solution to the
refugee problem is obviously to eradicate the
harms that produce the need to escape. It is
such a seductive notion that even the UNHCR
has joined in the call for a redefinition of
refugee protection to focus on what the Report
of the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (1995) called "preparedness, prevention and solutions."
In reality, however, no international commitment exists to deliver dependable intervention
to attack the root causes of refugee flows, clearly
a condition precedent to the exercise of any
genuine right to remain. There is no credible
evidence that intervention will ever evolve into
more than a discretionary response to the
minority of refugee-generating situations that is
of direct concern to powerful states. The interventions in both Iraqi Kurdistan and in the former Yugoslavia were responses to the clear risk
of refugee flows toward the developed world. Most
perniciously, these two examples of intervention
to enforce the "right to remain" suggest that this
so-called "right" is essentially a means to rationalize denying at-risk persons the option to flee.
Each UN intervention was inextricably tied to
border closures that left no way for would-be
refugees to access meaningful safety abroad.

Principles for a New Paradigm
of Refugee Protection
International refugee laws unilateral imposition of absolute responsibility on the asylum
state is not problematic if, as during the postwar era, there is a pervasive interest-convergence between refugee and host populations.
Absent such a natural symmetry, however,
refugee law can function only if there is a mechanism in place to mitigate the burdens of receiving states. The plight of Tanzania - faced with
massive, immediate, and potentially destabilizing refugee flows from Rwanda and Burundi raises starkly the absurdity of a refugee protection regime in which obligations are not adjusted to take account of circumstances in states of
destination. While less profound, the perceived
impact of refugee flows on societies in industrialized countries ought also to be factored into
the protection equation. Refusal to balance the
claims of refugees with those of receiving states
simply invites a continuation of present trends
toward en bloc denials of access.
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The time is right to focus on preserving the
essence of international refugee law as a system
for the protection of persons whose basic
human rights are at risk in their own state, until
and unless it is possible for them to return in
safety and dignity A reformulation of the mechanisms of refugee law should be dedicated to
securing this fundamental goal, taking into
account the real circumstances of an increasingly self-interested world. Four basic principles
are suggested to govern this transition.
First, refugee protection should not be
bartered away as part of the current upsurge of
interest in addressing the "root causes" of involuntary migration. While intervention may or
may not evolve as a more practical and globally
accessible answer to human rights abuse,
refugees ought not to be guinea pigs in that
experiment. Until and unless there is a dependable response to the risk of human rights abuse,
the autonomous right to seek protection outside
the frontiers of one's own state should not be
compromised.
Second, we should be open to the
enhanced flexibility that a robust system of
solution-oriented, temporary protection could
provide. To be attractive to states, temporary
protection will need to be constructed with a
strong emphasis on preparation for return.
Return itself will be a realistic option only if
supported by an empowering process of repatriation and development assistance. So conceived, temporary protection could regularly
regenerate the asylum capacity of host states.
To advocate the value of temporary protection is not to argue that immigration is bad: it is
simply not the same as refugee protection.
While the admission of outsiders to permanent
residence in a state may be a matter of legitimate debate for each country's body politic, the
basic protective role of refugee protection
should not be a captive in that debate. Simply
put, the human rights function of refugee law
does not require a routine linkage between
refugee status and immigration. If the protection of refugees is both durable and respectful
of human dignity, it need not be permanent.
Dignified temporary protection is not simply a
matter of meeting the minimum standards set
by international human rights instruments, but
rather requires full respect for the needs and
reasonable aspirations of refugees. It must also
be finite. It would not be reasonable to allow a
"temporary" protection regime to force refugees
to wait indefinitely before being allowed to
rebuild their lives for the long-term. If it incorporates these critical safeguards, temporary protection can be a meaningful response to involuntary migration.
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Third, we ought to dispense with the
Refugee Conventions unnecessarily rigid definition of state responsibilities. Beyond a common
duty to provide first asylum, there is no reason
to expect every state to play an identical refugee
protection role. Some states will be willing to
provide temporary protection, but not be disposed to the permanent integration of refugees.
Traditional immigration countries could readily
serve as sites of permanent resettlement for
those refugees whose countries remain unsafe at
the end of the period of temporary protection.
Still other states will be in a position to admit
special needs cases that should be diverted from
the temporary protection system. There will
also be governments that assume a mix of these
roles, or which provide major financial or logistical support to the refugee protection system. A
renewed international refugee law based on this
kind of common but differentiated responsibility toward refugees would provide a principled
yet flexible framework within which to reconcile the needs of refugees to the legitimate concerns of states.
Some will argue that a shift to equitable,
open-textured obligations would weaken international refugee law. This criticism does not
take into account, however, that the practical
value of formal refugee law has been decimated
by policies of non-entree and the containment of
refugees in their country of origin. I believe that
it is morally irresponsible to insist on the sanctity of traditional legal standards that we know
do not in fact constrain the self-interested conduct of states. If the international protection of
refugees is to be meaningfully regulated, then
we must temper the demands of moral criticality to meet the constraints of practical feasibility
International law is, after all, a consensual system of authority among states. If states are not
convinced that their interests are taken into
account by international refugee law, then in
practice - despite whatever formal standards
are proclaimed - international law will not
govern the way refugees are treated.
Fourth and finally, the institutions of international refugee protection need to be retooled
to promote and coordinate a process of collectivized responsibility UNHCR's recent efforts to
prove its relevance to governments have, regrettably, lent credibility to the politics of non-entree
and to the containment of refugees. UNHCR
should instead focus on the development of
dependable mechanisms equitably to share-out
responsibility for the protection of refugees
among states. By proposing the standards and
mechanisms to implement common but differentiated responsibility toward refugees, UNHCR
could prove that international law is still an
effective framework within which to manage
involuntary migration.

Critical Thinking Is Required Now
Refugee law serves fewer and fewer people,
less and less well, as time goes on. Refugee law
as traditionally conceived is being undermined
by a combination of non-entree tactics and
disingenuous insistence of the "right to remain."
We should seize the moment actively to
promote a new paradigm of refugee protection
that is both human rights-based and pragmatic.
Refugee law should be redesigned to take
account of the legitimate state preoccupations
that have undermined the value of law in
governing refugee protection, but without
compromising the essential commitment to
protection.
A renewed model of international refugee
law, built on the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility, would allow more
good to be done for more refugees than is
possible under the present regime. The small
minority of refugees that presently finds solid
protection in developed states may see a
reduction of its relative privileges under such a
system, but a reduction in the Cadillacs of the
few could, I believe, provide bicycles for the
many It is time to reconcile the need for a
secure and dignified refugee protection system
to the legitimate interests of the countries in
which refugees are sheltered. Refugee law so
conceived would regain its relevance.
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